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Abstract
This article formalizes investor rationality and irrationality, exuberance and apprehension, to
consider the implications of belief formation for the fragility of an economy’s financial structure.
The model presented generates a financial structure with portfolio linkages that make it susceptible
to contagious financial crises, despite the absence of coordination failures.  Investors forecast the
likelihood of loss from contagion and may shift preemptively to safer portfolios, breaking portfolio
linkages in the process.  The entire financial structure collapses when the last group of investors
reallocates their portfolios.  If some investors are irrationally exuberant, the financial structure
remains intact longer.  In fact, financial collapse occurs sooner when almost all investors are
rationally exuberant than when they are irrationally exuberant.  Additionally, a financial crisis
initiated by real shocks is indistinguishable from one caused solely by the presence of rationally
apprehensive investors in a fundamentally sound economy.  Policies that make portfolio linkages
more resilient can improve welfare.
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markets behave rationally most of the time, or that each and every participant in the
market has the same intelligence, the same information, the same purposes, and the
same economic model in mind, or that all markets behave rationally all the time? ….
Frequently the argument seems to be between two polar positions, one that holds that
no market is ever rational, the other that all markets are always so.  [Kindleberger,
1996, p. 20]
I.  Introduction
Economists from Cantillon to Kindleberger have speculated about whether financial markets
are fully rational or with some frequency over- or undervalue assets relative to the assets’
fundamentals.
1  This interest in the rationality of financial markets has been fueled by repeated
episodes of apparent irrationality, from the Dutch Tulipmania in 1637, to the British South Sea
bubble in 1720, to the Japanese real estate bubble in the late 1980s.
2  And it has not been confined
to academic circles.  In December 1996, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaching new
heights, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan suggested that “irrational exuberance”
could lead to “unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and
prolonged contractions,” and questioned how such a situation could be identified and how monetary
policy should react.  In April 1998, Eisuke Sakakibara, Japan’s vice finance minister for
international affairs, described the Japanese economy as suffering from “irrational pessimism.”
Since then, economists worldwide have pondered what it means for financial-market participants to
hold irrational beliefs and whether their doing so is bad in some appropriate sense.
This article attempts to address these questions.  Given the nature of the questions, the
answers necessarily depend on how rationality and exuberance—or the lack thereof—are
interpreted.  The approach adopted regarding rationality is the one common to much of late-20
th-
century macroeconomics.
3  Specifically, rational investors are assumed to have rational
expectations.  That is, they maximize an objective function subject to perceived constraints, and
                                               
1 Eighteenth-century economist Richard Cantillon is likely the first economist to have written on this subject.  In his
Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général, published posthumously in 1755, Cantillon writes about the role of
expectations and differences in information across investors in foreign exchange speculation, the tendency of people to
hold incorrect beliefs about fundamentals, and the South Sea bubble.  He describes, albeit indirectly, the circumstances
that generated the Mississippi bubble (1719-20), circumstances from which he profited greatly (Bordo 1983, Murphy
1986).
2 Kindleberger (1996) provides an extensive discussion of the relevant historical experience.
3 What it means, however, for agents to be rational remains an open question within the economics profession generally.
Arrow et al (1996) provide an overview of some of the unresolved issues.2
they use all the information available to them, including the true probability distributions of the
economy’s random variables, when forming expectations.  The implication, of course, is that
irrational, or boundedly rational, investors do not have rational expectations.
4  In particular, they are
assumed to optimize, but to form expectations given their subjective, and incorrect, beliefs about the
distributions governing random variables.  The subjective priors assumed generate posterior beliefs
that are the opposite of the beliefs held by rational investors.
The macroeconomics literature provides little guidance, however, regarding the modeling of
exuberance.  Dictionaries define “exuberance” as the state of being joyously unrestrained and
enthusiastic.  This definition is applied here by considering exuberant investors to be those who are
very optimistic about the prospects for the economy and thus for their investment portfolios.  To
better isolate the effect of exuberance in financial markets, the implications of there being a fraction
of investors who are not exuberant are also examined.  These apprehensive investors, as they are
called, perceive the economy’s fundamentals as poor and so expect losses on their portfolios.
To model rationality, exuberance, and apprehension under these interpretations, this paper
uses a variant of the model in Lagunoff and Schreft (1998).  That model consists of many projects
that require funding to operate, and many investors who provide the necessary funds.  The investors
initially hold portfolios that are linked in the sense that an investor’s expected and actual portfolio
returns depend on the portfolio choices of other investors.  Identically and independently distributed
shocks to the projects’ operations can cause some projects to fail initially.  All investors know the
probability of project failure and thus know the economy’s fundamentals.  Realized project failures
break some portfolio linkages, which causes some investors to incur losses and reallocate their
portfolios, thereby breaking additional linkages.  The initial project failures thus spark a contagious
financial crisis.  Investors who foresee the crisis reducing their portfolio returns can protect
themselves if desired by preemptively shifting to a portfolio that is safer in that it reduces their
exposure to any ongoing contagion.  Since all investors are identical, if one takes such preemptive
action, then they all do, causing the instantaneous collapse of all remaining portfolio linkages,
despite the absence of coordination failures.  An economy is considered more fragile the earlier this
total financial collapse occurs.
                                               
4 This formulation of the distinction between rationality and irrationality is consistent with Sargent (1993).3
The model presented below in Section II departs from the Lagunoff and Schreft model in
three critical respects.  First, here the economy’s fundamentals are uncertain in that the probability
of project failure, the parameter that characterizes the iid stochastic process, is not known.  This
requires investors to form expectations about both the fundamentals and their exposure to contagion
risk.  Second, investors’ information about the fundamentals comes from a noisy signal that they
observe and use in forming their expectations.  Since different investors can observe different
signals, heterogeneous beliefs are possible here, in contrast to the Lagunoff and Schreft paper.  This
heterogeneity can apply to posterior beliefs about fundamentals, about other investors’ beliefs, and
about the representation of beliefs within the population.  Finally, the equilibrium concept used here
differs from that in Lagunoff and Schreft in a subtle way.  In Lagunoff and Schreft the goal is to
look at the inherent fragility of an economy, so the focus is on the set of equilibria that keeps the
economy’s financial structure intact the longest.  As a device for finding such an equilibrium,
investors are assumed to make relatively optimistic forecasts.  That is, they foresee the possibility of
contagion, but not of preemptive behavior.  In contrast, in this paper investors make forecasts that
account for the possibility of both contagion and total financial collapse.
Two variants of the economy are studied.  The first, presented in Section III, takes investors
to be rational as defined above and looks at fragility when the fundamentals are strong, so
exuberance is justified.  The second, which is the subject of Section IV, assumes irrationality and
weak fundamentals.  This organization is motivated by von Hayek’s (1937) belief that “[B]efore we
can explain why people commit mistakes, we must first explain why they should ever be right.”
Several intriguing findings emerge.  First, exuberant investors remain invested at least as
long as their apprehensive counterparts, regardless of whether everyone is rational or irrational.  As
a result, the portfolio choices of the exuberant investors necessarily determine the date of total
financial collapse, and thus the economy’s fragility.  But the presence of apprehensive investors
also plays a critical role in determining fragility.  An increase in the presence of apprehensive
investors in the economy makes the economy at least as fragile.  This too is true whether everyone
is rational or irrational.  And if there is at least one apprehensive investor in the economy, total
financial collapse can occur, regardless of the fundamentals and the rationality of investors.  This is
the case even in an economy where all investors are rational and where the fundamentals are so
strong that nothing in the physical environment ever sparks a contagion.  The reason is rooted in the4
factors that generate apprehension.  Investors who receive misleading information about the
fundamentals, even if they know the true model of the economy (i.e., have the correct prior),
perceive a contagious financial crisis as more likely than it actually is.  Given this perception, they
believe they benefit from reallocating their portfolios to preempt experiencing portfolio losses.  This
behavior by itself initiates a contagious financial crisis.  The rationally exuberant investors in this
economy correctly forecast that the fundamentals make financial crises unlikely, but must respond
strategically to the portfolio reallocations they expect by the apprehensive investors.  They choose
to reallocate their own portfolios to protect themselves against losses due to the contagion the
apprehensive investors initiate.
Interestingly, rationally exuberant investors who live in a fundamentally strong economy
reallocate their portfolios sooner than irrationally exuberant investors who live in a fundamentally
weak economy, which makes the strong economy the more fragile one.  This finding stems from the
effect of irrationality on beliefs.  Investors who form expectations irrationally misforecast the
behavior of other investors and thus misforecast the fundamentals by a larger margin than they
would if all investors were identical.  As a result, irrational investors’ sentiments about the
fundamentals are more extreme than those of rational investors.
These results have some disturbing implications for policymakers concerned about
irrationality in financial markets.  First, an economy with rationality is indistinguishable from one
with irrationality in terms of the types of financial crises experienced.  Thus, an observer looking at
the realization of crises after the fact cannot tell whether the initial exuberance was rational or
irrational.  Second, an economy with sound fundamentals and rational investors experiences total
financial collapse at the same date as some economy with particular weak fundamentals and
identical investors who know those fundamentals.  This is discouraging news because it means that
a financial crisis that looks as if it were initiated by real shocks to the economy instead could have
been caused solely by the presence of rational, but unjustifiably apprehensive, investors.
Section V discusses the implications of these findings for welfare and policy.  Since all
investors, whether rational or irrational, optimize, they are as well off as possible, conditional on the
signals they observe and their beliefs.  There will always be some, however, who regret their
decisions.  They are the ones who do not preemptively reallocate their portfolios in time to avoid
incurring losses from contagion.  To reduce the likelihood of such regrets, policymakers can try to5
eliminate contagion.  A short-run policy option is for a lender of last resort to make loans to ensure
that no project lacks sufficient funding to operate solely because of contagious portfolio
reallocations.  Section V explains that such a policy is problematic and ineffective because the
model, as specified, requires that loans go to investors.  At best, the policy can stop contagion for a
period or two.  Alternatively, if the model allowed for agents who operated the projects, loans could
go to them instead.  That approach, however, brings with it moral-hazard problems.  It remains an
open question whether the benefits from such a lending policy exceed the costs.
In the long run, policies aimed at strengthening an economy’s financial infrastructure can
prove effective.  Examples include programs to obtain information about existing portfolio linkages
and to encourage diversification.  Such policies reduce the likelihood of contagion by increasing the
resiliency of portfolio linkages and reducing the cost to investors if links do break.  These policies,
like the lender-of-last-resort policy, must be implemented by an institution whose authority
encompasses all portfolio linkages.
A natural question, given the model’s results, is how this paper differs from the papers in the
large literature on bubbles.  A bubble is said to exist when the price of an asset is inconsistent with
market fundamentals.  In a narrow sense, then, the model presented here does not generate bubbles
because its asset prices are fixed.  In a broader sense, however, this model is about bubbles.
Bubbles arise when the demands for assets deviate from what is justified by market fundamentals,
and such deviations in asset demands do occur in this model.  When the demand for a project is
sufficiently high, the project operates and pays a positive net return.  But when the demand falls
sufficiently, the project fails to operate, paying a zero return and having zero value thereafter.
When rational exuberance is the dominant sentiment, there is a period during which the demand for
projects is lower than what market fundamentals dictate.  Likewise, when irrational exuberance is
prevalent, the demand for projects is sustained for a period of time beyond that justified by
fundamentals.  Yet there still exists a date, although possibly infinity, at which the mere anticipation
of a sharp decline in the demand for some projects leads investors to dramatically reduce the
demand for all projects, driving their values to zero.  In this sense, then, this paper is consistent with
the bubble literature.6
II.  The Economy
The model presented below is a variant of that in Lagunoff and Schreft that is more complex
in one sense and less so in another.  The added complexity derives from the differences in the
models’ state variables.  In Lagunoff and Schreft, the focus was on defining and characterizing
fragility and on assessing how fragility changes as an economy increases in size.  Consequently, the
size of the economy was a key state variable, and the economy’s fundamentals were assumed
known to all investors.  In this paper, in contrast, the objective is to see if investment behavior is
consistent with market fundamentals.  As a result, the economy’s size is fixed, but there is
uncertainty about the fundamentals.  Additionally, because different agents can observe different
signals about the fundamentals, heterogeneous beliefs are possible.  This means that agents must
forecast not only the risk of loss associated with the various portfolios, but also the forecasts of
other investors about investment risks.  To offset some of this added complexity, the model
presented here takes agents’ initial portfolio allocations as exogenous.  Lagunoff and Schreft show,
however, that there exist economies for which the initial portfolios assumed here are held in
equilibria of the type studied in both papers.
A.  The Physical Environment
Time is discrete and represented by t = 0, 1, ….  The economy consists of k investors, each
endowed at date 0 with two units of an indivisible object known as dollars and with nothing at later
dates.  Investors can provide for future consumption by investing their dollars in one of the
economy’s safe or risky assets.  Each investor has access to a safe asset that pays zero interest.  He
also has the option of investing in the economy’s k risky projects, which offer the chance of a higher
return.
Specifically, at each date a project yields a random return of R(I) dollars per dollar invested,
where I denotes the total number of dollars invested.  Each project can be operated only if it has
sufficient funding.  For simplicity, the critical level of funding—the level at which a project
operates and pays the maximum return per dollar, R —is taken to be $2.  Projects that have less
than two dollars invested in them pay a gross return per dollar of zero.  Once a project has been
insufficiently funded, it becomes inoperable at all future dates.  When a project is overfunded, with7
more than two dollars invested in it, decreasing returns are realized and the project yields a return
per dollar of 2 R /I.
At date 0 only, there is a second way by which a project can become inoperable:
independently and identically distributed shocks can cause projects to fail, pay a zero return, and
permanently cease operation.  The true probability of a project’s failing from an exogenous shock is
represented by the random variable ˆ, which can take one of two values, either zero or  p , where 0
<  p  £ 1.  Once a project fails, it is forever inoperable.  If a project succeeds at date 0, it pays a
return that depends on the amount invested, as described above.
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where  R
max > R  > 1.  The upper bound R
max is imposed for simplicity and assumed to be such that
no portfolio ever yields a dollar in interest, thus leaving investors with $3 to invest, and that no
investor who sustains a loss of any magnitude ever reinvests in more than one project.  Given that
investors are initially endowed with $2 and that dollars are indivisible, the first condition implies
that R  < 1.5, while the second, which rules out an unusual situation for notational simplicity,
requires  R  < 1.2.
The state of the economy depends on which value of ˆ is realized.  The set of possible
states is  w w 1 2 , l q, where state w 1 represents the case of ˆ = 0 and w 2  corresponds to the case of
ˆ =  p .  Each state occurs with probability 0.5.  Investors know that iid shocks are possible at date
0, but observe only a noisy signal of the true state, not the state itself.  The set of possible signals is
x x 1 2 , l q.  Investors differ based on which signal they observe:  those observing signal  x1 are of
type 1, while those observing  x2  are of type 2.  The probability that a random investor observes
signal  xi in state w j  is Pr | xi j w d i.  More specifically, Pr | xi i w b g = 1-e and Pr | x j i w d i = e, j „ i,
where e is a known constant less than 0.5.  That is, signal  xi is more likely to be observed in state
w i than in state w j , and there is no aggregate uncertainty in the distribution of investor types.  It8
follows that if state wi occurs, then a fraction 1-e of investors is randomly selected to observe  xi,
while a fraction e is randomly selected to observe  x j .  Investors thus can use the signal they
observe in forming expectations of the likelihood of each state and of the fraction of investors of
each type in the population.  Investors who forecast that the state is w 1 are taken to be exuberant
because they think the economy’s fundamentals, as measured by the probability of shocks at date 0,
are strong.  Likewise, those who forecast state w 2  are taken to be apprehensive.
While the true unconditional prior distribution over states is Pr w i b g = 0.5, much of the
analysis of rational and irrational exuberance in subsequent sections is concerned with implications
that stem from whether Pr ￿ bg is known and common knowledge, and thus whether investors are
rational.  To account for the possibility that investors’ subjective beliefs about Pr ￿ bg are in error,
Pr
i ￿ bg denotes type i’s subjective prior.  If, indeed, Pr ￿ bg is common knowledge, then
Pr Pr Pr
1 2 ￿ = ￿ = ￿ bg bg bg = 0.5.  It is assumed that type i believes that his model of the world is known
to be the true model in the sense that he thinks Pr
i ￿ bg is the true prior and common knowledge.
5
Given the information available to him, an investor chooses at each date how to divide his
remaining wealth between consumption in the current period and an investment portfolio that he
purchases at the beginning of the next date.  A portfolio at date t ‡ 0 is a triple  a a a ht jt st , , d i, where
aht  denotes dollars invested in risky project h at t, a jt  denotes dollars invested in risky project j, j „
h, and ast  denotes dollars invested in the safe asset.  Because dollars are indivisible, there are a
limited number of portfolios that can be held at any point in time.
6  An investor who chooses to
invest $2, for example, can hold any of the following portfolios:  a diversified loan portfolio
((1,1,0)), an undiversified loan portfolio ((2,0,0) or (0,2,0)), a part-safe-part-risky portfolio ((1,0,1),
(0,1,1), (1,0,0), or (0,1,0) since only part of the investor’s total wealth is at risk with these
portfolios), or a safe portfolio ((0,0,2), (0,0,1), or (0,0,0) since none of the investor’s wealth is at
risk with these portfolios).  An investor who chooses to invest $1 can hold an undiversified loan
portfolio ((1,0,0) or (0,1,0)) or a safe portfolio ((0,0,1) or (0,0,0)).  The gross return on portfolio
a a a ht jt st , , d i, which is realized at t, is r a a a ht jt st , , d i and is used to fund future consumption.
Without loss of generality, all investments are assumed to be for one period.
                                               
5 Brandenburger and Deckel (1990) discuss the role of common-knowledge assumptions.
6 The assumption that dollars are indivisible is equivalent to an assumption that investments must be made in $1
increments.9
At each date t ‡ 0 then, an investor with post-return wealth yt (or endowment wealth y-1)
chooses a sequence  a a a c h t j t s t t + + + 1 1 1 , , , d i o t to solve
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where ct is wealth consumed at t, and u() ￿  is an increasing, strictly concave, and time-separable von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with u(0) = 0.  The first constraint states that total
expenditures on consumption and investment cannot exceed available wealth.  The second describes
the evolution of post-return wealth and reflects the fact that investors can consume or reinvest their
portfolio returns.  The final set of conditions states that investments must be made in increments of
$1, that consumption must be nonnegative, and that an investor’s initial wealth is $2.
Investors are assumed to know k, the number of projects available initially, when they
choose their first portfolios.  These portfolio choices, as well as all later ones, are assumed to be
private information:  investors know their own portfolio allocations, but not those of others.  This
assumption is made to capture the notion of large, anonymous economies.  Investors also are
assumed to have limited ability to communicate and thus to overcome the information restrictions to
share risk.  Since investors do not know the true state, these assumptions on information and
communication imply that they also do not know the realization of shocks at date 0 or how many
projects are left at any time after the shocks hit.  They are aware, however, of the fate of the projects
in which they have invested.
Figure 1 below, which illustrates the timing of economic activity, provides a summary of the
physical environment just described.  Investors begin date 0 with $2, which they invest in a
portfolio of assets.  They then observe a signal regarding the probability of the iid shocks being
realized.  Next, the shocks are realized, causing some projects to fail.  If a project fails, the agents
who invested in it lose their entire investment.  After returns are realized, both at date 0 and at all
later dates, investors choose how to divide their remaining wealth between current consumption and
investment at the next date.  This completes the description of the physical environment.10
t = 0                                                                                                                                                                t = 1
Investors are endowed Investors observe Iid shocks to investment Project returns are realized.
with $2 with which  a signal, which  projects are realized. Projects that failed become
they purchase a determines their forever inoperable.
portfolio of assets. type. The consumption-investment
decision is made, and
consumption occurs.
t ‡ 1                                                                                                                                                                t + 1
Investment occurs.  Project returns are realized.  Insufficiently funded projects
become forever inoperable.  The consumption-investment
decision is made, and consumption occurs.
Figure 1—The Timing of Economic Activity
B.  Strategies
It remains to consider investor behavior.  The solution to the investor’s dynamic choice
problem depends on the functional form of utility, on the values of the model’s parameters, and on
the investor’s forecast about the behavior of other investors.  Complicating matters is the fact,
illustrated by Figure 1, that the investor’s problem is recursive after the shocks are realized, but not
before.  Since the goal here is to study the impact of rational and irrational exuberance on fragility,
this paper follows the approach of Lagunoff and Schreft.  It considers an economy to exhibit
financial fragility if the economy possesses a propagation mechanism that allows small exogenous
shocks at the initial date to generate financial crises that have large-scale effects on the financial
structure and thus on real activity.  Lagunoff and Schreft argue that to capture this notion of
fragility, a model first must give rise to portfolios that are linked, and second must incorporate some
mechanism that breaks linkages.  Thus, in what follows attention is restricted to economies with
these two features.  The first feature arises as long as each investor holds diversified portfolios at
the start of date 0; otherwise, an investor has his wealth in at most one risky project.  In this model,
investors who think that ˆ = 0 based on the signal they observe are indifferent between holding
diversified and undiversified portfolios, but prefer either portfolio to the alternatives.  Investors who
think that ˆ= > p 0 may prefer to hold a diversified portfolio, depending on their preferences and
the values of the economy’s parameters.  To focus most directly on economies that could possibly
be fragile, in what follows investors are assumed to start date 0 with their $2 endowment invested in11
the best diversified portfolio—namely a maximum-return diversified portfolio.  This portfolio
consists of two $1 investments in projects that receive exactly $2 in funding and thus pay the
maximum return of R  per dollar.
7  An advantage of this assumption is that, in an economy where
ˆ = 0 is common knowledge, investors holding such portfolios never choose to reallocate their
portfolios at later dates.
Another advantage of this assumption is that it allows the economy’s initial portfolio
allocations to be represented by a collection of closed chains.  A closed chain is a set of projects and
investors such that each project is fully funded, each investor is fully invested and diversified, and
investor portfolios are all linked.  Figure 2 depicts a closed four-link chain, since every investor is
linked directly or indirectly to four projects.
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Figure 2—A Closed Chain
When a shock at date 0 causes a project to fail, it turns the closed chain in which the project
resides into an open chain.  An open chain is the same as a closed chain, except that some investors
are not diversified because they lost $1 when a project failed.  Figure 3 depicts the open chain that
arises when project 3 in Figure 2 fails.
While the shocks at date 0 initiate linkage breaks, fragility requires that there be a
propagation mechanism that magnifies the effects of the shocks.  In what follows, attention is
restricted to economies in which such a propagation mechanism exists.  More precisely, attention is
restricted to economies in which, at each date t ‡ 0, an investor who has lost $1 prefers not to
                                               
7  Lagunoff and Schreft show that there are economies (i.e., specifications of the utility function and ranges of parameter
space) for which an equilibrium exists with maximum-return diversified portfolios chosen by investors at the start of
date 0.
n = project   l = investor12




Figure 3—An Open Chain
reinvest in a risky asset.
8  That is, investors who find themselves on the ends of an open chain
choose not to reinvest their remaining dollar in the chain at the next date.  In Figure 3, for example,
this means that investors D and C shift out of risky assets and consume their remaining wealth,
which results in projects 4 and 2 receiving insufficient funding and thus investors A and B incurring
portfolio losses and subsequently not reinvesting in project 1.  The result is that open chains unravel
over time.
In this environment, the unraveling of open chains constitutes a financial crisis, a collapse of
all or part of the chain structure.  It is the result of optimizing behavior by investors in response to
portfolio losses sustained.  The likelihood of such crises depends on the economy’s initial mix of
chains and the number and distribution of shocks realized.
The mix of chains that exists at any point in time represents the economy’s chain
structure—or financial structure.  Since investors are assumed to hold maximum-return diversified
portfolios initially, the date-0 chain structure consists solely of closed chains.  Nothing in the model
identifies the process that determines the initial chain structure.  All investors, however, are
assumed to know the true probability distribution over the possible chains in which they can find
themselves before shocks hit.  At any time after shocks are realized, the chain structure is a mix of
closed and open chains, but only those chains that could have evolved from ones possible initially.
An implication of the assumption that portfolios are private information that cannot be
communicated is that investors do not know the economy’s chain structure, whether they are in an
                                               
8 Lagunoff and Schreft show that there exist economies in which, in an equilibrium of the type studied, investors who
have lost $1 rank portfolios in this manner.
n = project   l = investor13
open or a closed chain, or their location within their chain.  Investors can, however, contemplate the
possibilities of their being in the various locations in the various chains and thus can evaluate their
exposure to contagious losses and strategically act to protect themselves.  It remains to specify
investors’ behavior in the dynamic recursive game that is played at each decision point after the
shocks have been realized.
In addition to observing a signal about the state of the economy, an individual investor
observes st, the post-return state of his portfolio, that prevailing after returns are realized and when
he has to make his consumption-investment decision.  That is, he knows at each date, after realizing
his returns, whether he has incurred a loss of any or all of his initial $2 endowment.  His state st is
from the set {Wt, Ht, Zt}, where Wt is the state in which he still has his whole initial endowment, Ht
is the state in which he has half of his initial endowment because he has incurred a $1 loss, and Zt is
the state in which he has zero dollars left.  Based on the signal observed  xi b g and the state of his
portfolio, the investor chooses an action a regarding his portfolio, where a is from the set {D, U, P,
S}.  Action D is the choice to continue holding a diversified portfolio at the beginning of the next
date.  Action U is the choice to deviate to an undiversified portfolio; action P, a part-safe-part-risky
portfolio; and action S, a safe portfolio (Section II-A describes these portfolios).  With this
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t i , b g denotes the action taken by investor type i in state st at time t.  Type i’s forecast of
others’ behavior is a symmetric strategy profile denoted  ~ f




t 1 2 b g b g d i, with
~ , f s x t
i
t j d i representing i’s forecast at date t of type j’s (j = 1,2) strategy when j is in state st.
Forecast  ~ f
i  is a conditionally correct forecast if it coincides with strategy  f
j  that j chooses if j
thinks i’s prior Pr
i ￿ bg is the true prior.  The notion of equilibrium defined in the next subsection
assumes that all investors’ forecasts are conditionally correct.
Finally, type i’s post-return expected lifetime utility at t from strategy  f s x t
i
t i , b g and
forecast  ~ f
i  is denoted V f f s x t
i i
t i ,
~ | , d i.  Appendix A presents the expressions for these expected
utilities for each possible state and each possible action an investor can take.
C.  Equilibrium and Fragility
The preceding specification of strategies and forecasts implies symmetry in the strategies of14
investors of the same type.  In what follows, then, only symmetric equilibria are studied, and they
all share two features.  First, as stated previously, to ensure the existence of a propagation
mechanism that can permit small shocks to have large-scale effects, the economies studied have the
property that investors who lose $1 do not reinvest in the chain structure.  That is, in equilibrium,
f H x S t
i
t i , b g = .  Second, since all investors are assumed to hold diversified portfolios before the
realization of shocks and to maximize utility, those in state Wt compare the expected lifetime utility
at the end of date t from continuing to hold a diversified portfolio at t + 1 to that from the best
portfolio of each alternative type.  If  f
i a ,  denotes the strategy of a type-i investor who chooses
action a at date t, given state Wt and signal xi, then the expected utilities associated with the various





| , d i, for a = D,U,P,S.  Thus, investors continue to hold
diversified portfolios as long as







, , , , ~ | , max , ~ | , , , ~ | , , d i d i d i o ‡ V f f W x t
i S i
t i
, , ~ | , d it.
The following definition captures these features of a symmetric equilibrium.
DEFINITION.  A maximal sustainable equilibrium with conditionally correct forecasts is a symmetric
strategy  f
i* for each investor type i = 1,2, such that
  i.  For each date t and each state s,  f s x t t i




| , d i, where
~ f
i  is a conditionally correct forecast.
  ii.  For each t,  ~ , f W x D t
i
t j d i = , provided that for each j = 1,2,






t j , ~ | , max , ~ | , , , ~ | , , d i d i d i o ‡ V f f W x t
jS i
t j , ~ | , d it.
  iii.  Investors start date 0 holding maximum-return diversified portfolios.
  iv.  For each t,  f H x S t t i
i* , b g = .
By construction, then, in a symmetric equilibrium there exists some first date at which
investors of type i decide to switch from a diversified portfolio to the next-best alternative, which is
necessarily safer in that it involves less exposure to contagion risk (fewer dollars at risk, or dollars
at risk from contagion from fewer directions).  And by the equilibrium’s symmetry, if one investor
of type i decides to reallocate his portfolio, then all investors of type i do so.  The exit-decision date
at which type i investors all decide to reallocate and thus exit, or disconnect from, the chain15
structure at the next opportunity, given e, is denoted by ti(e).
The effect of e on ti(e) is complicated because e represents both an investor’s uncertainty
about the true probability of project failure at date 0 and his belief about the fraction of investors of
each type.  To sort out the effect of e on ti(e), it proves useful to look at the exit-decision date in an
economy in which all investors share the same beliefs and assign probability 1 to the event ˆ = p
for some p > 0.  This is exactly the Lagunoff and Schreft economy.  In what follows, the exit-
decision date for this economy with homogeneous beliefs and certainty about the fundamentals is
denoted by t p b g.  By construction, it is the first date t for which
9
V f f W x V f f W x t
i D i
t i a D t
i a i
t i
, , , ~ | , max , ~ | , d i d i <
„ .
The exit-decision date t p b g isolates the effect of e on uncertainty about ˆ.  Consequently, the
difference between dates t p b g and t e ib g measures the effect of e on the existence of heterogeneous
beliefs within the population.  The smaller is e, the farther apart are the beliefs of the type-1 and
type-2 investors, as are their exit dates, t e 1b g and t e 2b g, respectively.  As e ﬁ 0.5, the beliefs of
the two investor types converge, as do their exit-decision dates:  t t 1 2 05 05 . . b g b g = .
When t e 1b g and t e 2b g differ, the early exiting of some investors has the same effect on the
economy as would a second round of shocks to projects.  The only difference is each realization of a
shock at date 0 causes a single project to fail, whereas each investor in state Wt who exits the chain
structure causes two projects to fail, the two that were in his portfolio.  The decision at the latter of
the t e ib g of some investors to exit induces a financial crisis involving the simultaneous collapse of
all remaining chains, whether open or closed, when the investors actually reallocate at the next date
(max
i i t e b g+1).  The crisis occurs because optimizing investors strategically choose to reallocate
their portfolios as protection against possible losses, even if they have not experienced losses
themselves and do not know for sure that losses are occurring.  Thus, it can occur in addition to the
crisis associated with the unraveling of chains, simply because investors act preemptively to protect
themselves against the event that their own chain might unravel.  And one would expect, as is
shown below, that the early exiting of some investors causes it to occur at least as soon as it
                                               
9 The exit-decision date t p ( ) is an equilibrium in pure strategies in the Lagunoff-Schreft economy with homogeneous
beliefs of the type specified here.  This equilibrium involves a two-action-best-response cycle between strategies U and
S at the exit-decision date.  There thus must exist an equilibrium in which investors use mixed strategies at the exit-
decision date.  It is conjectured, but not proven here, that for some preferences and parameter values, an equilibrium
exists in pure strategies as well.16
otherwise would have.
It follows that an economy may be characterized as more fragile the earlier the date at which
its entire chain structure collapses (i.e., the earlier max
i i t e b g+1).  This does not mean, however,
that every economy’s financial structure collapses.  While max
i i t e b g can be zero, in which case the
economy’s chain structure collapses with certainty when investors reinvest at date 1, it also can be
infinity, which means the economy never suffers a complete financial collapse due to strategic
investor behavior.
A desirable feature of a maximal sustainable equilibrium is that it gives rise to a date of
certain and complete financial collapse later than that of any other equilibrium.  Lagunoff and
Schreft introduce the concept because their goal is to assess the inherent fragility of an economy.
As a modeling device to find such an equilibrium, Lagunoff and Schreft assume that an investor
makes an optimistic forecast—a forecast  ~ f
i  such that, for all t ‡ 0 and each type i = 1,2,
~ , f W x D t
i
t j d i =  and  ~ , f H x D t
i
t j d i „ .  An investor with this forecast expects that other investors
continue to hold diversified and linked portfolios until they personally experience losses and then
shift to safer portfolios.  The optimistic forecast implies that investors foresee the contagious
financial crisis initiated by shocks to projects, but not the preemptive behavior that instantaneously
induces total collapse.  In contrast, the equilibrium concept defined above assumes that investors
make conditionally correct forecasts.  Such forecasts arise when investors have foresight about both
the contagious crisis and the preemptive behavior, and so are less optimistic than optimistic
forecasts.  These forecasts are necessarily correct conditional on the signal investors observe and on
the model they use in forming expectations.  If investors observe the better signal, given the true
state, and use the true probability distributions in forming expectations, then their forecasts also are
unconditionally correct.  In subsequent sections, all references to correct or incorrect forecasts refer
to unconditional accuracy.
Interestingly, the optimistic forecast can be used to construct bounds on the exit-decision
date of an investor with conditionally correct forecasts.  The reason stems from the difference
between an investor with an optimistic forecast and one with a conditionally correct forecast.  The
latter recognizes that there is a date at which everyone else in the economy exits; the former does
not.  An investor with an optimistic forecast thus never exits sooner than one with a conditionally
correct forecast.  And a type-i investor with a conditionally correct forecast remains diversified at17
all dates t < t e ib g because, by equilibrium condition ii, he expects everyone of type i to do so.  It
follows that the portfolio reallocations at t e ib g+1 are due solely to beliefs about fundamentals, not
to any coordination failure.  When e = 0, there is only one type of conditionally correct investor, so
his exit-decision date is the same as that in an economy with identical investors with optimistic
forecasts.  That is, for a type-i investor who thinks ˆ = p with probability 1, t i 0 b g = t p b g by
definition of t p b g.  Thus, in subsequent sections, the optimistic forecast is used to find t i 0 b g.
This completes the description of the economy.  It remains to analyze rational and irrational
exuberance.  This is done in the remainder of the paper by studying two special cases of the
economy:  one with strong fundamentals and rational investors, and one with weak fundamentals
and irrational investors.  For each case, bounds on the exit-decision date for each investor type are
found, making use of the case e = 0 and its associated exit-decision date t p b g.
III.  Rationality, Exuberance, and Apprehension
A special case of the economy described above is used in this section to study rational
exuberance and apprehension.  Specifically, the true state of the economy is assumed to be w 1, so
that the economy’s fundamentals truly are strong (ˆ = 0), and investors are assumed to have
rational expectations as commonly defined.  That is, investors are assumed to optimize and to form
expectations using the true distributions Pr w i b g and Pr | xi j w d i, for i, j = 1,2.
In this rational economy, the investors who observe signal  x1 believe Pr | w 1 1 x b g = 1- e  by
Bayes’ Rule, and thus for e < 0.5 believe, correctly, that the true state is most likely w 1 and that
shocks are unlikely to be realized at date 0.  Given Pr | xi j w d i, they believe, also correctly, that the
other type-1 investors constitute a fraction  1
2 2 - + e e b g  of the population and therefore that the type
1s are in the majority.
Similarly, investors who observe signal  x2  believe Pr | w 1 2 x b g = e  by Bayes’ Rule, and thus
believe that the true state is most likely w 2 .  That is, unlike the exuberant type-1 investors, the type
2s believe that shocks most likely are realized at date 0 and thus are apprehensive about their
portfolios’ prospects.  Given their type and their beliefs about the state, they also believe that the
other type-2 investors represent a fraction  1
2 2 - + e e b g  of the population.  They are incorrect, of
course, about which state is most likely and about their type’s majority status in the economy, but18
their beliefs are nonetheless rational.
If e = 0, this economy is characterized by pure rational exuberance:  all investors observe
signal  x1 and believe correctly that the true state is w 1.  No financial crises occur because no
shocks initiate the unraveling of chains and no investors anticipate incurring losses because of
contagion.  The exit-decision date for these rational investors, represented by t 1 0
Rb g, equals t 0 b g,
which is infinity.
For economies with e > 0, no matter how small, the analysis is significantly more difficult
because there are two types of investors in the economy, each forecasting the state, the presence of
investors of other types, and the beliefs of those other types.  Because a total collapse of the
economy’s financial structure occurs when the last group of investors reallocates their portfolios, it
is easiest to start by examining the apprehensive investors—the ones who expect shocks to be
realized at date 0.  As stated above, the apprehensive investors (type 2) think that there is a fraction
e of the population of type 1.  To make conditionally correct forecasts of the type 1s’ behavior, the
apprehensive investors use their own priors, but since their priors are common to all investors, their
forecasts are accurate:  they believe that the type 1s expect no shocks to be realized and thus to
remain diversified at least as long as they themselves do.  Each apprehensive investor also forecasts
correctly that the other apprehensive investors all make the same forecasts that he makes and find it
a best response to hold a diversified portfolio when they expect everyone else to do so.  With these
beliefs, the environment in which an apprehensive investor pictures himself is the same as that in
Lagunoff and Schreft when shocks are realized with probability  p  and investors think everyone
else remains diversified at least as long as he does (the optimistic forecast).  It follows that an
apprehensive (type 2) investor’s exit-decision date, denoted t e 2
Rb g, is simply t p b g ‡ 0.
Like their apprehensive counterparts, the exuberant type-1 investors accurately forecast the
beliefs of the type 2s because they use the true and common prior Pr w i b g.  As a result, they
anticipate the apprehensive investors deciding at date t p b g to exit and initiating a contagion at
t p b g + 1.  The best response for the exuberant investors is to decide to exit at some date t e 1
Rb g,
where t e 1
Rb g £ t 1 0
Rb g = ¥.
The date t e 1
Rb g is a function of how many projects the type-1 investors expect to fail at
t p b g, which depends, in turn, on which portfolio the type 2s switch to and how many type-2
investors exist.  Type-1 investors correctly believe that the type 2s constitute a faction e of the19
population, and they can accurately forecast the portfolio to which the type 2s switch.  If, for
example, the apprehensive type 2s decide at date t p b g to switch to a safe portfolio, then at date
t p b g + 1 they do not reinvest in any of their previously held projects.  The worst-case scenario in
terms of fragility occurs when the e type-2 investors have no projects in common in their portfolios.
In this case, 2e projects fail when the type 2s exit at t p b g + 1.  In the best case, all the type 2s are in
adjacent projects in chains, and their portfolio reallocations cause e + 1/k projects to fail.  If, instead,
the apprehensive investors deviate to a part-safe-part-risky portfolio at date t p b g+1, then each
immediately consumes a dollar (because the safe asset pays zero interest and investors discount the
future) and reinvests a dollar in one project.  This causes e projects to fail at t p b g+1 in the worst
case, e 2 to fail in the best case, and type 2s to find themselves with at most R  dollars to allocate
at t p b g+1 between current consumption and future investment.  By equilibrium condition iv, the
type 2s do not reinvest at date t p b g+2, causing the failure of another ek 2 to ek of all projects.
In choosing strategies, exuberant investors use their forecasts of the type 2s’ date-(t p b g+1)
portfolio allocations and of how investors of different types are distributed around chains.
Whatever these forecasts, it is clear that the type 1s’ best response to the type 2s exiting at t p b g + 1
is to exit themselves at some date t e 1
Rb g + 1, where ¥ ‡ t e 1
Rb g ‡ t e 2
Rb g = t p b g ‡ 0, even though
they correctly believe that the economy’s fundamentals most likely do not warrant it.  This result is
summarized in the following proposition, which is proven in Appendix B along with all other
results.
PROPOSITION 1.  If  p  is sufficiently large that t p b g < ¥, then there exists e > 0 such that
t e t e 1 2
R R b g b g ‡  for all e e ˛ 0, g.
The exiting of the rationally exuberant investors from the economy brings about total
financial collapse because they are the last of all investors to exit.  The economy could collapse at
an earlier date by chance if the right mix of shocks is realized at date 0 and all chains happen to
unravel before t e 1
Rb g+1, but it collapses with certainty at date t e 1
Rb g+1.  And, as the following
proposition states, date t e 1
Rb g is nonincreasing in e.
PROPOSITION 2.  t e t e 1 1 1 2
R R b g b g ‡  if e e 1 2 £ .20
Intuitively, when e is higher, type-1 investors assign lower probability to state w 1, with ˆ = 0, and
they believe that a smaller fraction of the population expects that ˆ = 0.  Thus, an increased
presence of apprehensive investors in the economy does not reduce fragility.
A third, and striking, finding is that the financial collapse that occurs because type-1
investors decide at t e 1
Rb g to exit is indistinguishable from the collapse that occurs in an economy
with homogeneous beliefs and certainty that ˆ =  ¢ p  for some  ¢ p .  Formally:
PROPOSITION 3.  There exists  ¢ p  such that t t e ¢ = p
R b g b g 1 .
That is, a financial crisis that looks as if it had been initiated by real shocks actually could have
been caused solely by the presence of a small share of investors who were apprehensive—though
rationally so—about the economy’s prospects.  Without knowledge of the true fundamentals, an
observer cannot determine whether a crisis occurred because of less-than-pure rational exuberance
in a fundamentally sound economy.
IV.  Irrationality, Exuberance, and Apprehension
A second special case of the economy of Section II is suitable for the analysis of irrational
exuberance and apprehension.  In this variant, the true state of the economy is w 2 , the state in
which the fundamentals are poor (ˆ= p ), and investors’ expectations are formed irrationally in the
following sense:  investors optimize and know the true likelihoods (that is, they know that
Pr | xi i w b g = 1-e and Pr | x j i w d i = e for j „ i), but they do not use the true priors over the w i.

























That is, a type-1 investor uses a pessimistic prior, one that assigns more probability weight to the21
worse state, w 2 , while a type-2 investor uses an optimistic prior, assigning greater probability
weight to state w 1.  In addition, investors believe that their own priors are the ones used by all
investors, and they do not recognize the dependence of their priors on the state.
Clearly, many subjective priors are consistent with investors forming expectations
irrationally in some sense.  The priors assumed here are used because they generate beliefs about
the probability of the states w i that are the exact opposite of those held by the rational agents of
Section III.  Specifically, given these priors, the application of Bayes’ Rule yields the posteriors
Pr |
i
i i x w e b g =  and Pr |
j
i j x w e d i = - 1  after investors observe their private signals.  This implies,
given that the true state is w 2 , that a fraction 1- e  of investors observes signal  x2  and so is of type
2.  The type 2s believe, given their optimistic subjective priors, that the true state is w 1 with
probability 1- e  and w 2  with probability e .  Likewise, a fraction e  observes x1 and is of type 1.
They pessimistically assign probability e to state w 1 and probability 1- e  to state w 2 .  Thus, in this
economy with irrational investors, it is the type 2s who end up with posterior beliefs that are
unjustifiably exuberant and the type 1s who have posteriors that are apprehensive and relatively
more correct, at least about the state.
The use of the subjective priors introduces an interesting complication into the analysis.
Since investors believe, incorrectly, that their subjective priors are the priors used by all investors,
they make incorrect forecasts of both the distribution of investor types in the economy and the
beliefs of investors not of their type.  Specifically, in forecasting the beliefs of the type 2s, the
pessimistic type-1 investors, who think the state is most likely w 2 , use Bayes’ Rule with their
subjective prior, Pr
j
i w e e e b g b g b g e j = - - + 1 1
2 2 2 , and conclude that the type-2 investors assign
probability e e e
3 3 3 1- + b g , which is less than e for e < 0.5, to state w 1.  That is, the type 1s
believe, incorrectly, that the type 2s think state w 1, with ˆ = 0, is even less likely than they
themselves believe it to be, and thus that the type 2s are the most apprehensive investors in the
economy.  But given the known likelihoods Pr | x j i w d i = e  and Pr | xi i w b g = 1- e , the type 1s think
their type is a minority of the population and that the type 2s are the majority.
10  In this, at least,
they are correct, since the true state is w 2 .  The optimistic type 2s, who think the true state is w 1,
use the same approach to forecasting the beliefs of the type-1 investors.  They wrongly conclude
                                               
10 It can readily be verified that a type i investor assigns probability 2 1 e e - ( ) to other investors being of type i.22
that the type 1s assign probability  1 1
3 3 3 - - + e e e b g b g , which exceeds 1-e for e < 0.5, to state
w 1.  As a result, the type 2s think the type 1s are the most exuberant investors in the economy.  And
they wrongly believe that the type 1s are in the majority.  Every investor, then, incorrectly believes
that his own type is the minority and that everyone else is at least as exuberant or apprehensive as
he is.
Investors use these irrational forecasts in determining their strategies.  The true apprehensive
investors, the type 1s, think that shocks most likely are realized at date 0, but they also think that the
type 2s assign even higher probability to such an outcome and believe themselves to be in the
majority.  The type 1s thus predict that the type 2s believe that the majority of the population thinks
a contagious financial crisis to be very likely and decides at some date to exit.  If, for example, e =
1/k, which approaches zero as k approaches infinity, there is one type-1 investor in the economy.
This sole type 1 believes first that everyone else (the type 2s) thinks that virtually everyone is of
type 2, and second, that the type 2s think ˆ =  p > 0 is at least as likely as he thinks it is.
11  The
type 1 also perceives type-2 investors as thinking that all investors continue to hold a diversified
portfolio as long as their expected lifetime utility from doing so exceeds that from switching to the
next-best alternative portfolio.  But this is exactly what an investor in the Lagunoff and Schreft
economy thinks when the probability of shocks is believed to be  p .  Consequently, the type-1
investor forecasts that the type 2s’ exit-decision date is t p b g ‡ 0.  This is an ominous forecast for
the type-1 investor because the exiting of the type 2s causes projects to fail at t p b g + 1 in addition
to those the type-1 investor expects to fail from the contagion induced by date-0 shocks.  The best
response for the type-1 investor in this environment is to choose an exit-decision date t e 1
Ib g, where
t e 1
Ib g ‡ t 1 1
I k b g = t p b g ‡ 0.  In summary, although the type 1s correctly forecast which state is
most likely, they incorrectly forecast the forecasts of the type 2s, and thus perceive the risks to their
portfolios as greater than they are in actuality.  That is, their prior about the state is pessimistic, but
they end up even more pessimistic about the prospects for their portfolios because they incorrectly
forecast the beliefs of others.  Type-1 investors thus personify Chicken Little, thinking that the sky
is falling and reacting accordingly, contributing to the economy’s fragility by exiting at least as
                                               
11 It does not make sense to analyze the case of e = 0 in this irrational economy because all investors, thinking that their
type is a fraction e of the population, would thus think that they did not exist.  Such thinking would reflect insanity, not
irrationality.  Thus, the smallest e can reasonably be is 1/k.23
early as they would if they recognized the type 2s’ true exuberance.
The exuberant type 2s do not fare any better in forecasting the type 1s’ behavior.  They think
it unlikely that any shocks are realized at date 0, and they perceive the type 1s as viewing shock
realizations as even less likely and thinking type 1s are in the majority.  The type 2s therefore think
that the type 1s are likely to continue to hold diversified portfolios at least as long as the type 2s.
Again, if, for example, e = 1/k, then each type-2 investor believes incorrectly that he is the only
type-2 investor, is virtually certain that no shocks hit at date 0, and thinks that everyone else in the
economy is at least as certain that no shocks are realized.  This is the economy of Lagunoff and
Schreft with a true probability of project failure of zero.  In the limit, as k approaches ¥, the exit-
decision date of the type 2s, denoted t 2 1
I k b g, equals t 0 b g, which is infinity.  Thus, for any e, t e 2
Ib g
satisfies 0 £ t p b g £ t e 1
Ib g £ t e 2
Ib g £ t 0 b g £ ¥.  In summary, type-2 investors’ prior about the state
is optimistic, but they end up even more optimistic about the prospects for their portfolios because
of their incorrect forecasts.  Type-2 investors, then, are the quintessential Cockeyed Optimists,
sustaining the economy’s financial structure longer than they would if they recognized the type 1s’
true apprehension.  The following proposition formalizes these results:
PROPOSITION 4.  If  p  is sufficiently large that t p b g < ¥, then there exists e > 0 such that
t e t e 1 2
I I b g b g £  for all e e ˛ 0, g.
Since total financial collapse occurs with certainty when the last investors reallocate their
portfolios, the behavior of the type-2 investors determines the date of collapse in the economy with
irrationality.  Total collapse occurs at date t e 2
Ib g + 1, where t e t e 2 1 1
I I b g b g ‡ ‡ .  Of course, as e
increases, type 2s think all investors assign less probability to state w 1 and believe that there are
more type 2s around to exit early.  That is,
PROPOSITION 5.  t e t e 2 1 2 2
I I b g b g ‡  if e e 1 2 £ .
It follows that the economy is at least as fragile the greater is e.
Furthermore, the irrational type-2 investors are not only irrationally exuberant; they are also
more exuberant than the rational type-1 investors are in an economy in which the true state is w124
(i.e., the type-1 investors studied in Section III).  This result arises because the irrationally
exuberant type-2 investors misforecast by a large margin both the likelihood of the true state and the
beliefs of the minority group (the type-1 investors).  Because these type 2s believe the irrationally
apprehensive type 1s to be the truly irrationally exuberant investors in the economy, the type 2s are
more irrationally exuberant than they would be otherwise.  Thus, irrational type-2 investors exit
later than rational type-1 investors, which means that the economy with irrational exuberance is less
fragile than that with rational exuberance, given e.  Similarly, the irrationally apprehensive type-1
investors are even more apprehensive than the rationally apprehensive type-2 investors.  The
following proposition formally states these results.
PROPOSITION 6.  (a)  t e t e 2 1 0
I R b g b g > ‡ , and (b)  0 1 2 £ < t e t e
I R b g b g.
V.  Implications for Policy
The preceding sections examine economies with particular combinations of the state and
beliefs for the purpose of characterizing rational and irrational exuberance.  Collectively, the results
yield a ranking of exit-decision dates:
12
0 0 1 2 1 2 £ £ < £ < £ = ¥ t t e t e t e t e t p
I R R I b g b g b g b g b g b g .
Since these dates are independent of the true state, they can be applied to more general economies
that consist of both rational and irrational, type-1 and type-2 investors.
13
By using these exit-decision dates, investors maximize their expected lifetime utility, given
the signal they observe about the state and their priors.  In some sense, then, they are as well off as
possible if they use these exit dates.  This is true even though some of them exit too early or too late
                                               
12 More specifically, this ranking of exit-decision dates follows from Propositions 1, 4, and 6.  Thus, it applies to
economies for which those propositions hold.  Such economies must have two features.  First, they must have the two
critical properties discussed in section IIb, namely that portfolios are initially linked and that there is a mechanism for
breaking linkages.  Lagunoff and Schreft have shown that these properties characterize the equilibrium of some, but not
all, economies.  Second, they must have the property, required for Proposition 1 to hold (the proof is in Appendix B),
that the true probability of a project’s failure due to a shock,  p , be large enough that, if all investors believe that  p  is
the true probability with certainty, then they have a finite exit-decision date t p ( )  that is decreasing in  p .
13 These exit-decision dates are for an economy of a given size k (i.e., measured in terms of number of investors and
projects).  Lagunoff and Schreft show that for sufficiently large economies, the exit-decision date of type i investor
decreases as the economy becomes even larger.  This result applies to each investor type here as well.  The ranking of
exit-decision dates remains the same as the economy becomes larger since it was derived for any given economy size.25
relative to what is appropriate based on the true state.  For example, if the true state is w 1, e is
approximately zero, and k is very large (approaching infinity), then approximately all investors
observe signal  x1 and the exit-decision dates are simply t t t p
I R b g @ < @ ¥ 1 1 .  If investors discover
the true state after the collapse is over, the irrational ones realize that no shocks were realized and
regret having exited preemptively.
Even if investors never discover the true state, there will always be some who regret their
decisions.  They are the ones who incur losses from contagion before their scheduled exit date.
Depending on the realization of shocks and the initial chain structure, there could be many such
investors, or just a few.  These investors will look to policymakers for remedies and for assurances
that such a crisis will not occur again.  Of course, no such assurances can be given because shocks
and beliefs are exogenous and the chain structure is unknown, but there are some policy options.
In the short term, policymakers are limited to trying to stem any ongoing contagion.  A
commonly used approach is for some institution to serve as a lender of last resort who lends funds
immediately after shocks are realized to prevent additional losses.  In the economy of Section II,
such an institution could be modeled as being known to and able to provide information to all
investors, but having no greater knowledge of the economy than anyone else (i.e., it does not know
the chain structure or realization of shocks).  It could announce that it stands ready to extend
emergency credit and could raise resources to fund its activities either by creating funds (e.g.,
issuing a fiat currency) or taxing the return on projects.  Agents would reveal themselves to the
lender of last resort to obtain credit.  Since investors are the only agents in the economy, they are
the ones to whom any loans must go.  This by itself makes the policy problematic.  The reason is
that loans must go to investors who actually incur losses and, by equilibrium condition iv, are about
to reallocate their portfolios, initiating the first round of contagion.  But portfolios are private
information, so all investors, whether or not they have incurred losses, have an incentive to request
loans under such a policy, and policymakers have no way to identify the legitimate borrowers.  The
policy also is ineffective because at best it postpones the contagion for two periods.
14  This stems
                                               
14 It is instructive to see why lending to investors does not work here because the reason highlights the role portfolio
linkages play in generating contagion.  Someone who incurs losses on both investments because of shocks, and thus
borrows $2, cannot reinvest in his formerly held projects because they are no longer operative.  He instead must put the
funds into a safe portfolio, which means he either consumes them immediately or consumes $1 and puts $1 in the safe
asset for one period.  An investor who only loses $1 from shocks still has a project in which he can reinvest.  In the best-
case scenario for reducing contagion, he invests the $1 he borrows plus the remaining dollar of his endowment into the26
from the simplicity of the model and the nature of the chain structure.
A lender of last resort conceivably could end contagion, at least on average, by making loans
to projects.  This policy could be used if the model is modified by adding agents who operate
projects and can reveal themselves if their projects do not receive sufficient funding to operate.
There typically is a moral-hazard problem, however, in making loans to such agents, so it is unclear
whether the policy can improve welfare on net.
The model also suggests some longer-term measures that a lender of last resort or
government entity can take to reduce the likelihood of contagion.  For example, monitoring lenders’
portfolios provides information about the economy’s linkages that a lender of last resort can use to
identify projects at risk of receiving insufficient funding and to coordinate a response among
investors.  The supervision of banks by governmental regulatory organizations is an example of a
policy that achieves this end.  A second example is policies that result in greater diversification and
thus increase the number of shock-induced project failures needed to initiate a crisis.  An
implementation of such a policy in the United States is the restriction that allows money-market
mutual funds to hold only a limited share of their portfolios in the commercial paper of a single
issuer.  These types of long-term measures can result in a stronger, more resilient chain structure
and thus can reduce the likelihood and severity of contagious financial crises.
For such policies to be effective, however, they must be adopted by an entity with authority
regarding all possible portfolio linkages because all linkages contribute to an economy’s fragility.
Thus, if the model is taken to be one of a small closed economy with strict capital controls, then the
entity could be a domestic institution.  For open economies with global linkages, fighting contagion
requires an organization of international scope.
Appendix A
This appendix presents the expected lifetime utilities associated with an investor’s
                                                                                                                                                           
one project that is left in his portfolio.  But his former coinvestor also reinvests either $1 or $2.  As a result, his pre-tax
return is at most 4 3 R .  Given the bounds on  R , the tax rate, and equilibrium condition iv, he at best only consumes
his interest and reinvests $1 for one additional period.  Thus, a policy of extending emergency credit to investors who
incurred losses at most postpones the contagion for a period or two.27
continuing to hold diversified portfolios or deviating to another portfolio in the dynamic recursive
game that begins after the shocks are realized.  As explained in Section II-C, the bounds on the exit-
decision dates t e ib g are the exit-decision dates from an economy with investors who make
optimistic forecasts and are homogeneous (e = 0) and where the true probability of shocks ˆ is
believed to be p.  That economy is the one described in Lagunoff and Schreft.  Hence, the expected
utilities for all t < t e ib g here are those from Lagunoff and Schreft, who provide a thorough
derivation in their Appendix A.
15
In this model, the expected lifetime utility from any portfolio must depend on both the
probabilities of being in the various chains and the expected utilities associated with those chains.
Calculating the latter for open chains requires considering the utility associated with the various
positions in the chain and the likelihood of an investor’s being in each position.  An open r-link
chain has r - 1 investors who are in state Wt.  Two of them will lose $1 because their coinvestors
are in state Ht and will not reinvest, while the rest will not incur losses if they remain diversified
another period but will incur losses eventually as their chain shrinks and their coinvestors end up in
state Ht.  The expected lifetime utility from remaining diversified if in an open r-link chain, denoted
p
D r b g, is thus
p
b bp D r r
u R u R u
r
u R r r
r
( )
max , ( ) ,
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if
In contrast, investors in closed chains can remain diversified permanently, enjoying the lifetime
utility of p ” u R 2 2 1 - - c h a f b .
With Crt   Nrt b g denoting the event that an investor is in a closed (open) r-link chain at the
beginning of date t, the probability of an investor’s being in a closed (open) chain at the beginning
of date t, conditional on his being in state Wt and having observed signal  xi, can be denoted
Pr , C W x rt t i -1 c h  Pr , N W x rt t i -1 c h d i.
16  A closed r-link chain after returns are realized at t ‡ 0 must
have evolved from a closed r-link chain that existed at the start of date 0 and had no project failures
                                               
15 Investors’ strategies at date t e
i( ) in this model may differ from those in Lagunoff and Schreft because here type i
investors correctly forecast that at t e
i( ) all investors of type i decide to exit, whereas in Lagunoff and Schreft investors
forecast that everyone remains diversified who has not incurred a loss.  This difference is immaterial, however, because
the focus here is only on the date at which investors exit, not on which portfolio they switch to at that date.
16 The probabilities are unchanged if they are calculated after returns are realized at date t - 1, when the investor makes
his consumption-investment decision.28
due to shocks.  If q r k , b g denotes the probability of an investor belonging to a closed r-link chain
before the shocks, then Pr | , , C W x q r k r i 0 1 - = b g b g.  And, at the start of any t ‡ 1, the nonnormalized
conditional probability of a closed r-link chain, denoted Pr | , C W x rt t i -1 b g, is q r k p
r , b gb g 1
2 -
-  if 2 £ r
£ k and zero otherwise.
Likewise, an open r-link chain at date t had to have evolved from an open chain that existed
immediately after the shocks were realized, which itself had to have come from a closed chain that
existed initially.  The nonnormalized probability of an investor’s being in an open r-link chain at the
start of date 0, denoted Pr | , N W x r i 0 1 - b g, is clearly zero.  But
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-
= +
because an open r-link chain at date 1 could have come about by exactly one shock hitting a closed
(r + 1)-link chain at date 0, or two shocks hitting a closed chain with at least r + 2 links at date 0.
This expression makes use of two facts:  only the two shocks that create the endpoints of an open
chain matter, and an investor knows his own portfolio and thus that, if he is in state Wt, the two
projects in his portfolio could not have been hit by shocks.  The probability of open chains at later
dates takes into consideration that an open chain will have lost two projects in each preceding
period.  Thus, Pr | , N W x rt t i -1 b g=Pr | , N W x n t i 1 1 - b g, where n  = r + 2(t-1).
These probabilities can be normalized by dividing them by Lt , the total probability weight
attached to all r-link chains at date t, where
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Making use of these expressions, the expected lifetime utilities from an investor’s taking
various strategies in various states can now be specified:29
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Appendix B
This appendix proves the propositions, making use of the expected utility functions specified
in Appendix A.  For notational simplicity in what follows, first define30
v u R u R u ” - + max , c h c h bg n s 1 1 b ,
v u R u R u u R u u R u u ” - + - + - + + max , , , 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
2 c h c h bg c h b g c h bg bg n s b b b b .
Further, define probability weights
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It follows that
1 2 1 - - = + d g t t t t i N W x Pr | , d i.
Let  f
i a ,  denote a strategy in which investor i chooses action a at date t in state Wt.  A
necessary condition for  f
i a ,  to induce a maximal sustainable equilibrium from date t + 1 on is that
equilibrium condition iv—that  f H x S t
i
t i + = 1 , b g , or equivalently, V f f H x v t
i S i
t i + + = 1 1
, ,
~
| , d i —holds.
Hence, the expected lifetime utility in state Wt from a strategy  f
i a ,  that induces a maximal
sustainable equilibrium from date t + 1 on is, for each a = D,U,P,S and for each t  < t p b g
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The next lemma is used in the proofs of the proposition that follow.
LEMMA.  Suppose that v v ‡ 15 . .  Then t ￿ bg is decreasing in p.
PROOF.  Fix an equilibrium strategy  f
i* such that investor i chooses action D at date t.  Let
f
i a , *  denote the equilibrium strategy identical to  f
i* except that the investor chooses action a at
date t.  Let Vt
pb g denote the expected lifetime utility from a strategy, so the dependence on p is
explicit.
Given p, observe that t p b g is the first date t for which
V f f W x V f f W x t
p i
t i a D t
p i a i
t i
i* * , ~ | , max , ~ | ,
, d i d i <
„ .31
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Case (i).  a S = .





| , d i - V f f W x t




| , d i may be expressed as
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+ + ‡ ‡ 1 1
*,
~
| , d i  since  f
i* induces an equilibrium from date t + 1 on
such that the investor does no worse than he would from choosing S at time t + 1 and thus getting
utility of v .  Also, it is clearly the case that V f f W x t
p i
t i
i*, ~ | , d i ‡ V f f Z x t
p i
t i
i*, ~ | , d i = 0.
To show that (2) is decreasing in p, two facts must be established.  First, for r ‡ 3, it must be




+ + 1 1
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| , d i in (2), which is given by
Pr | , Pr | , N W x r C W x r t t i r t t i + + - - + 1 1 1 2 1 d i b g c h d i, decreases relative to the probability weight
assigned to v , which is Pr | , N W x r r t t i + - 1 2 1 d i b g c h.  That is, it must be shown that
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is decreasing in p for r ‡ 3.  Second, it must be shown that for r = 2, the weight on
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must be shown to be decreasing in p.
Both Pr | , N W x r t t i +1 d i and Pr | , C W x r t t i +1 d i, defined in Appendix A, are continuous in p.
Using these formulas, expression (3) can be written
r q r k
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while (4) can be written32
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Both are clearly decreasing in p.  By demonstrating term by term in the sum over r that the
probability weight shifts to smaller expected utilities as p increases, it can be established that
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| , d i decreases in p.  This concludes the proof of Case (i).
Case (ii).  a P = .
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Using the same term-by-term arguments given in Case (i), it suffices to show that
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| , . d i .  As stated before,  f
i* induces an
equilibrium from date t + 1 on in which the investor can do no worse than to choose S at time t + 1,
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*, ~ | , . d i , the latter inequality following from the
hypothesis.
Case (iii).  a U = .
From (1), the difference V f f W x t
p i
t i
i*, ~ | , d i - V f f W x t
p i U i
t i
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V f f W x t
p i U i
t i
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~ | , d i at date t by supposition, it must be true that V f f W x t
p i i
t i + + 1 1
*,
~ | , d i ‡ u R 4 3 c h.
Hence, the term-by-term argument of Case (i) can be used once again to establish the result.
QED. n
PROPOSITION 1.  If  p  is sufficiently large that t p b g < ¥, then there exists e > 0 such that33
t e t e 1 2
R R b g b g ‡  for all e e ˛ 0, g.
PROOF.  Clearly, t t 1 0 0
Rb g b g = = ¥, and t t 2 0
R p b g b g = < ¥, where  p  is again the true
probability of a shock in state w2.
Suppose by contradiction that t e t e 1 2
R R b g b g < .  Lett e i
R*b g be the exit-decision date for
investors of type i who assign probability 1-e to the value of ˆ consistent with state wi, but assign
probability 0 to the existence of state j „ i.
From the supposition that t e t e 1 2
R R b g b g < , it follows that t e t e 2 2
R R b g b g £ * .  That is, since
type-2 investors exit later than type-1 investors, if type-2 investors think there are no type-1
investors—which is the case when their exit-decision date is t e 2
R*b g—then type-2 investors need
not worry about earlier defaults created by type-1 investors exiting.
Likewise, it follows that t e t e 1 1
R R b g b g ‡ * .  That is, since the later exit of type-2 investors
does not affect type-1 investors at the earlier date at which the type-1 investors exit, type-1 investors
do not exit any later if they believe that there only exist type-1 investors.
In summary, it has been shown that
t e t e t e t e 1 1 2 2
R R R R * * £ < £ b g b g b g b g.   (7)
But it is also the case that, by the Lemma, t e t 1 0
R* ﬁ = ¥ b g b g  and t e t 2
R p * ﬁ < ¥ b g b g  as e ﬁ 0,
which contradicts the string of inequalities in (7).  Therefore, t e t e 1 2
R R b g b g ‡  for sufficiently small
e. n
COROLLARY.  ¥ = ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ = * * t t e t e t e t e t t 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0
R R R R R R p b g b g b g b g b g b g b g.
PROOF.  These inequalities can be constructed from the proof of Proposition 1. n
PROPOSITION 2.  t e t e 1 1 1 2
R R b g b g ‡  if e e 1 2 £ .
PROOF.  If e e 1 2 £ , then by Bayes’ Rule, type-1 investors believe Pr | , w e 1 1 x i b g = 1 - e,
which is decreasing in e.  Hence, when e e = 1, type 1s exit no earlier than when e e = 2. n
PROPOSITION 3.  There exists  ¢ p  such that t t e ¢ = p
R b g b g 1 .34
PROOF.  By the proof of Proposition 1 (or its Corollary), t t e t p
R b g b g b g £ £ ” ¥ 1 0 .
Suppose t t e p
R b g b g < < ¥ 1  (otherwise the proof holds for each  p  or p = 0).  It can now be
proven that if t p t 1 1 b g =  and t p t 2 2 b g = , with t t 1 2 1 > + , then there exists  p p p
* , ˛ 1 2 b g such that
t p t
* d i = + 2 1.
By the Lemma, it must be the case that  p p 1 2 < .  Let V a t
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where  f
i a ,  is the strategy with  f W x a t
i
t i , b g =  for a D U P S ˛ , , , l q.  The proof of the Lemma shows
that V D V a t
p
a D t
p b g b g -
„ max  is continuously decreasing in p.  By the Lemma and the definition of a
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the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists  p p p
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a D 2 2 1 1 0 + +




e e b g b g .  Therefore, t p t
* d i = + 2 1.
Now let t p t b g = 2  and t 0 1 b g = ¥ = t .  Applying the result t p t
* d i = + 2 1 iteratively, for
each t with t p t b g < < ¥, there exists  ¢ p  such that t ¢ = p t b g .  Hence,  ¢ p  can be chosen such that
t t e ¢ = p
R b g b g 1 . n
PROPOSITION 4.  There exists e > 0 such that " ˛ e e 0, g, t e t e 1 2
I I b g b g £ .
PROOF.  The proof is analogous to that for Proposition 1. n
PROPOSITION 5.  t e t e 2 1 2 2
I I b g b g ‡  if e e 1 2 £ .
PROOF.  The proof is analogous to that for Proposition 2. n
PROPOSITION 6.    (a)  t e t e 2 1 0
I R b g b g > ‡ , and (b)  0 1 2 £ < t e t e
I R b g b g.
PROOF OF (a).  Label the economy with rational agents (presented in Section III) as economy
I and the economy with irrational agents (presented in Section IV) as economy II.  Compare the
behavior of type-2 investors in state w2 in economy II to that of type-1 investors in state w1 in
economy I.  Both groups constitute a fraction 1 - e of the population and assign probability 1 - e to
the state with favorable fundamentals, w1.  This implies that type-1 investors in economy I exit at35
date t e 1
R*b g (defined in the proof of Proposition 1) if they assign no weight to the existence of
investors unlike themselves, while type-2 investors in economy II exit at t e 1
Ib g if they give zero
weight to the existence of investors like themselves.
In economy I, the smaller group, the type-2 investors, are known to assign probability e to
state w1.  By contrast, in economy II, if the smaller group of type-1 investors acts according to the
prior held by type-2 investors, then they assign probability  1 1
3 3 3 - - + e e e b g b g  to w1.  Hence, the
smaller group in state w2 of economy II is believed by the majority to be more optimistic than the
smaller group in state w1 of economy I.  Indeed, since e < 0.5,  1 1
3 3 3 - - + e e e b g b g  > 1 - e, which
means that type-1 investors are believed to be even more exuberant about state w1 than type-2
investors.  By accounting for type-2 investors’ beliefs about the smaller type-1 group in model II, it
follows that t e t e 2 1
I R b g b g >
* .  Combining this inequality with the Corollary gives the desired result.
PROOF OF (b).  The argument is completely analogous to that for (a), so most of the details
are omitted.  Observe only that in economy I, type-1 investors believe type 2s have the same prior
as their own.  Hence, type 1s believe that type 2s have posterior Pr | w 2 2 x b g = 1 1
3 3 3 - - + e e e b g b g
> 1 - e.  That is, type-2 investors are believed to be even more apprehensive than type 1s.  Since
type 2s are believed to be the majority by type 1s, the type 1s are more apprehensive than the type
2s in economy I.  Reasoning analogous to that for case (a) establishes that t e t e 1 2
I R b g b g <
* . n
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